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RUNNING SILENT AND ALGORITHMIC
The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision in 2019
 As of January 2019, the U�S� Navy does not possess a coherent, public, strategic vision�1 The official statement of strategy, or the Navy’s strategic concept, to 
use a term inspired by the late Samuel P� Huntington’s term, remains A Coopera-
tive Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready of March 2015, 
whose acronym is CS21R (R for revised)�2 The Department of the Navy (DON) 
leadership has never declared CS21R to be superseded, nor has anything been 
published to supplant it�3 However, CS21R was written to support (and possibly 
shape) the foreign policy proclivities of the administration of President Barack 
H� Obama; its predecessor document, CS21 of October 2007, was released dur-
ing the administration of President George W� Bush� Both of these presidents
endorsed engagement with the international community (albeit in contrasting
forms)�4 The public statements of President Donald J� Trump appear to indicate
that some of the principles articulated in CS21R may no longer be a good fit,
and indeed the emergence of an international system dominated by great-power
competition is now more apparent� Outsiders who study the policies of the U�S�
Navy are well aware of this disconnect�5
Yet the U�S� Navy does, in fact, have a strategic vision that reflects the tenets of 
former Secretary of Defense James N� Mattis’s National Defense Strategy (NDS)� 
Within the Chief of Naval Operations staff (OPNAV), this strategic document 
has been referred to as “the Navy’s response to the NDS” or “the Navy’s contri-
bution to the joint force�” Like the NDS, it is classified “Secret” and not available 
publicly� Unlike the NDS, however, the Navy document does not have an unclas-
sified summary, and there is little indication that one eventually will be prepared�
If the Navy’s strategic vision is not available publicly, how can we make sense 
of the service’s future policies, resource requirements, dispositions and deploy-
ments, and budget submissions? Likewise, how can the U�S� Navy convince the 
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American people—and obviously the political decision makers—of the validity 
and logic of its course? How do we know what the naval leadership intends? 
In the spirit of the descriptions (and hype) of current discussions of artificial 
intelligence (AI), we can apply human intelligence by analyzing the sum of what 
can be described metaphorically as a complex algorithm� In other words, we 
can combine the current white papers and program guidance(s) of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) and Secretary of the Navy, along with related official 
and semiofficial sources, to generate an approximate outline of the U�S� Navy’s 
strategic focus�6
STRATEGIC VISION BY ALGORITHM
Included in this algorithm are (1) the 2018 National Defense Strategy and its 
publicly released Summary; (2) CS21R, which lays out what remains the official 
(DON) strategy but appears overtaken by events and out of sync with presidential 
guidance; (3) three white papers that provide general direction from the current 
CNO, Admiral John M� Richardson, USN; (4) remnants of the officially super-
seded Air-Sea Battle, a victim of joint ideology; (5) the report to Congress from 
an officially unofficial Navy future fleet architecture study team; (6) a numerical 
goal—355 ships—that appears largely in the rhetoric of senior officials; and (7) a 
book-length monograph attempting to define the current Navy in terms of naval 
war fighting that was commissioned by a previous CNO but released only weeks 
before his retirement (and thus is of questionable authority)� Unlike the seven 
samurai (or seven gunfighters) of legend and film, these seven share a similar 
cause but do not necessarily fight well together�
In addition to these seven items there are statutory reports to Congress, such 
as the thirty-year shipbuilding plan and the Secretary of the Navy’s annual report, 
from which can be gleaned particular details or other clues about the Navy’s navi-
gational track�7 Additionally, as previously noted, classified top-level guidance or 
guidances from the Secretary of Defense exist—including the 2018 NDS—that 
cannot be ignored and, under Secretary Mattis, shaped (and changed) the Navy’s 
approach to building its vision�
Meanwhile, the U�S� Navy also has its classified guidance prioritizing its 
resource requirements for its program objective memorandum (POM) sub-
mission to the defense budget�8 This strategic planning guidance, long-range 
planning guidance, Navy strategic plan for program objective memorandum, or 
simply guidance (the name changes with CNOs) is used by Navy program ana-
lysts and resource sponsors in lieu of translating a loftier strategic vision from 
strategy-speak to programese�9 The current Chief of Naval Operations guidance 
(CNOG) for the fiscal year 2020 program objective memorandum actually was 
written ahead of the then-under-draft “response to the NDS�” So, in fact, the 
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programming transliteration actually appeared (within the OPNAV staff) prior 
to the written strategy narrative.10
In a well-planned deployment, all these sources would synchronize to create 
a whole greater than the sum of their parts. Alas, conflicting perceptions of the 
post–post–Cold War world and rival political and bureaucratic ambitions have 
created crosscurrents that subtract as well as add. For example, some of these 
documents were written under the assumption of increased defense resources, 
whereas the midterm election of November 6, 2018, led to new House Armed 
Services Committee leadership that has been warning of leaner defense budgets.11 
SEVEN PRIMARY SOURCES FOR DETERMINING NAVY’S STRATEGIC VISION
Document Type Source Release Date Status
1 Secretary of  
Defense guidance
Summary of the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy (Summary NDS)
2018 Dominant joint/DoD guidance
2 Preexisting  
strategic vision
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, 
Ready (CS21R) 
March 2015 Current Navy official vision




a. Design for Maintaining Maritime 
Superiority, 1.0 (Design 1.0)
b. The Future Navy
c. Design for Maintaining Maritime 







Affirms majority of 1.0; adds 
specific guidance
4 Air-Sea Battle 
remnants
a. Admiral Greenert, USN, and 
General Mark Welsh, USAF, Breaking 
the Kill Chain
b. Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea 
Battle: Multi-service Collaboration 
to Address Anti-access and Area Denial
c. Hutchins et al., “Joint Concept for 
Access and Maneuver in the Global 
Commons,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 




Publicly subsumed by Joint 
Access and Maneuver in the 
Global Commons (JAM-GC) 
joint concept paper (however, 
JAM-GC is applicable only  
tangentially to antiaccess  
challenges)
5 Navy Project 




Report to Congress: Alternative Future 




Overtaken by events and 355 
number?
6 Directive for 355-
ship Navy
Executive Summary, 2016 Navy 




2018–19 FSA is under way





How We Fight: Handbook for the 
Naval Warfighter
July 2015 Unclear and unpublicized
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The intent of this article is to sum the algorithm and provide an outline of the U�S� 
Navy’s current service strategic vision�
DOES IT REALLY MATTER?
Before describing each of the seven algorithmic inputs, we first need to deal 
with the question whether having a public USN strategic vision really matters� 
To the naval analyst operating in fleet commands, or even in the trenches of the 
Pentagon, and other navalists in general, the probable answer is “not really�” As 
Admiral Carlisle A� H� Trost, USN (CNO, 1986–90), stated, “Over the years our 
Maritime Strategy has been very much like the British Constitution—unwritten 
but thoroughly understood by those who practice it�”12 Indeed, for those who 
serve in the fleet, the objectives of deterring war, maintaining U�S� access to 
the materials and markets of international trade, intervening in crises when so 
ordered, fighting terrorist groups, and providing a sovereign, forward presence 
are quite evident� For those who work on future Navy programs and budget, the 
CNOG and other classified documents are more directly useful�13
Ultimately, however, it is not the Navy or even the Secretary of Defense that 
actually determines Navy programs and budget, but rather the members of 
Congress as representatives of the American people� The fact that congressmen 
who normally are supportive of the naval services recently have expressed their 
desire that the Navy articulate a clear vision should be of concern to the service�14 
Yet, taking its cue from Secretary of Defense Mattis, who showed a penchant to 
discourage “too much” openness to media, the Navy has continued to run (rela-
tively) silent�15
There are at least three likely explanations for the secretary’s caution with the 
media� First is the official reason: too much information should not be trans-
mitted to potential enemies� But in the case of the U�S� Navy, whose strategic 
predilections were made clear through media speculation (and some public 
discussion) of the air-sea battle concept (circa 2009–15), that reason seems a 
bit implausible� The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and others know toward 
whom the Navy’s operational planning is directed�16 Second might be his desire 
that the services tightly conform to the jointly focused NDS� Since the Navy is 
known for its independently derived strategic visions—primarily on the basis of 
applying its own traditional operating concerns against changing conditions and 
emerging threats—this seems a more plausible concern� Third, more specula-
tively, is that the Secretary of Defense wants to ensure that the Navy—along with 
the other services and the rest of the Department of Defense (DoD)—does not 
get crosswise with future tweets and other sudden proposals emanating from the 
White House�17 The president announced his desire for a 350-ship Navy at ap-
proximately the same time as he announced his proposals for a reduced federal 
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budget�18 Quiet might be prudent at this particular moment� However, silence 
over its service visions never has seemed to help the Navy’s long-term viability in 
the past, particularly in terms of budget and force structure�
THE CASE OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY
The public release of the Cold War–era Maritime Strategy in 1986 is one example 
of how public discussion—particularly by influential academics, with all the dis-
putation and opposition that implies—actually improved the vision, raised public 
awareness of the Navy’s mission, and generated considerable congressional inter-
est�19 With strong presidential interest and support for the strategy (which justi-
fied the political goal of a six-hundred-ship Navy), the public discussion served 
the Navy’s institutional interests�20 Primarily through media reports of reactions 
and resulting controversies, American citizens who might never have given their 
Navy a thought became aware that the Navy was doing something important�21
Additionally, a case can be made that public release of the Maritime Strategy 
actually heightened Cold War conventional deterrence, since the cacophony of 
debate reinforced a belief in the minds of Kremlin decision makers that the U�S� 
Navy / Marine Corps actually would employ its major forces in carrying out 
audacious and high-risk attacks on the Soviet periphery in the High North and 
Pacific in the event of a war in central Europe�22 If the U�S� Navy was willing to sail 
its carrier battle groups (in conjunction with its attack submarines [SSNs]) in the 
face of long-range Soviet bombers and attack aviation in an attempt to penetrate 
ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) bastions and destroy the Soviet fleet within 
home waters, what else might it attempt?23
Interestingly, there are continuing indications that, similarly, analysts working 
for the CCP today frequently are concerned that they might miss critical policy 
nuances revealed in cacophonous American public debates, even while many 
American decision makers treat that cacophony as background noise�24
VISION AMID AUSTERITY
There is yet another purpose for creating and updating a clear strategic 
vision—but one that naval decision makers hesitate to contemplate, lest their 
fears become reality� A clear strategic vision helps to maintain the motivation and 
morale of naval personnel and public support for the naval services during times 
of fiscal austerity� Samuel Huntington identified this factor in his argument for 
a naval strategic concept in the 1950s� Huntington noted that “if a service does 
not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and political leaders will 
be confused as to the role of the service � � � and apathetic or hostile to the claims 
made by the service on the resources of society�”25 At that time, both a shrink-
ing (or, rather, already shrunk) budget and the arguments of the U�S� Air Force 
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threatened to strip the U�S� Navy and Marine Corps of their wartime missions� 
Initially, the DON seemed unable to articulate its purpose in the nuclear age� 
After all, having defeated imperial Japan in the greatest joint campaign in mili-
tary history, the service’s relevance seemed evident—at least to the Navy itself� 
However, by accepting the need to develop and promulgate a strategic concept 
understandable to the public as well as political decision makers, Navy and Ma-
rine Corps leaders were able to reestablish an internal sense of purpose as well as 
regain public and congressional support� Having a vision that was both internal 
and public was a particular priority under the extended tour of duty of Admiral 
Arleigh A� Burke (CNO, 1955–61)� As an internal guide, an unclassified Naval 
Warfare Publication (NWP) 1, Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, was created as 
the foundation for all other naval publications� It was updated routinely until its 
quiet demise in the 1990s�26
The post-Vietnam Navy (circa 1974–81) was racked by personnel problems, 
arguably because of both reduced funding for readiness and a lack of a motivat-
ing sense of purpose� The creation of the Maritime Strategy was instrumental in 
regaining this sense of purpose�
There are strong indications that the promise of a 350- or 355-ship Navy by 
the Trump administration—whatever its degree of commitment—may give way 
to a reduction in the overall defense budget under new Democratic leadership 
in the House of Representatives� There had been previous stirrings among fiscal 
hawks in both parties, and Secretary of Defense Mattis never committed himself 
to the 355 number�27 Thus, the Navy’s anticipated increase actually may turn into 
a winter of decreased resources�28 Such winters are times when strong and clear 
vision seems to be needed most�
In sum, a clear, publicly articulated Navy strategic vision has mattered—for 
congressional and public support, as well as for internal morale and sense of 
purpose� Its absence does have effects�
NDS AND THE NAVY
If NDS is the driver of the current Navy self-vision, what is in the document that 
directly affects the Navy?
Working from the unclassified Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
of the United States of America (hereafter Summary NDS), one first observes that 
its strategic change toward a “balance of power” approach to deterrence should 
mean a tilt toward the Navy’s traditional missions� The Summary NDS states 
unequivocally, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the pri-
mary concern in U�S� national security�”29 Although the U�S� Marine Corps, Naval 
Special Warfare (SEAL), and explosive ordnance disposal units and naval tactical 
aviation were involved deeply in countering jihadists—who also occasionally 
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were targeted by Tomahawk-firing ships and submarines—most of the blue- 
water Navy had but tangential roles in countering terrorism, even if one counts 
the Navy individual augmentees in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq�30 The Na-
vy’s primary purposes—of ensuring access to the markets and materials that con-
stitute international trade and deterring, fighting, or facilitating power projection 
in interstate war—were not part of what former Defense Secretaries called “the 
wars we are in�” If interstate conflict is now “where it’s at,” with the primary list of 
likely opponents being represented by the 2+2 construct of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) and Russia, followed by Iran and North Korea, then the Navy has 
to be a primary fighting component, given that all the above are separated from 
the United States by oceans�31
However, as one reads through the Summary NDS, a subtle ground force– 
centric approach to strategy can be detected� For example, the global operat-
ing model for joint force posture is described by the four terms contact, blunt, 
surge, and homeland (CBSH)�32 The first three are general descriptions of phases 
of a land campaign that do not have exact naval equivalents� Would forward-
deployed naval forces constitute a contact layer, or are they a standing blunt 
force? Both terms imply a classic ground engagement among armies, whereas 
modern naval combat is described most persuasively as “a struggle for the first 
salvo” (even if that is a Cold War Soviet concept) or an attempt to “attack effec-
tively first” (in the words of Captain Wayne P� Hughes Jr�, USN [Ret�])�33 The U�S� 
Navy never actually has surged in a war against a powerful naval opponent� In 
the World War II Pacific War, most high-value units were already at sea or within 
range of the enemy; instead, the surge occurred in industrial production and 
mobilization—a feat that many doubt could be replicated today� Likewise, the 
maritime defense of the homeland is largely the responsibility of the U�S� Coast 
Guard, although SSBNs remain the most survivable leg of strategic nuclear deter-
rence, and naval theater ballistic-missile defense, along with Aegis Ashore, could 
be integrated into national missile defense (a mission the Navy has avoided)� 
It simply is tough to fit naval war fighting into the CBSH formula—a fact that 
may have deeper implications� One can shoehorn naval force structure into the 
formula for comparative modeling with land forces, but only by “fuzzing” their 
designed operational employment�
Following a fairly traditional description of objectives, strategic objectives, 
and desired capabilities—none that would be completely out of place in a Cold 
War document—the Summary NDS sets goals of “building a more lethal force” 
and “modernizing key capabilities” in such areas as “forward force maneuver 
and posture resilience”—presumably a Navy forte� Although the Summary NDS 
calls for prioritizing investment in forces that “can deploy, survive, operate, ma-
neuver, and regenerate in all domains while under attack,” the sole detail offered 
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for this force investment is the effort to transition from “large, centralized, un-
hardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing�”34 Since 
the Navy has advertised itself long and loudly as the strategic alternative to large, 
centralized, unhardened (land) infrastructure, one might assume that unique 
naval capabilities might be mentioned briefly at that point in the Summary NDS 
document—but they are not�
What does the absence of the quite standard praise of naval forces (even in 
joint documents) as maneuverable and dispersed sovereign territory not fettered 
to land infrastructure and capable of crisis response (blunting, perhaps?) mean? 
One merely can speculate, but perhaps the Secretary of Defense really did not 
believe that the fleet is actually as effective or survivable in an antiaccess scenario 
(or the current preferred term of contested environment) as the Navy perceives 
itself to be� In any event, the Summary NDS does not contain a lot of hooks on 
which the Navy can hang its narrative hat—unless it wants to challenge joint 
ideology� A search of the Summary NDS failed to detect a single use of the word 
ocean�35
The Summary NDS does devote a full two pages (out of eleven total) to DoD’s 
desire to “strengthen alliances and attract new partners�”36 It focuses on three 
elements: “uphold a foundation of mutual respect, expand regional consulta-
tive mechanisms and collaborative planning � � � and deepen interoperability�” 
Regional alliance and partnership networks are delineated (Indo-Pacific, NATO, 
Middle East, Western Hemisphere, and Africa)� In this, the Summary NDS could 
fit easily into an Obama or Bush (either forty-one or forty-three) administration 
document� It also, amazingly, could fit within CS21R—except for a few telling 
details in the “uphold” element that tie back to Trump administration themes, 
including accountability�
The first of those details alluding to the Trump administration’s particular 
viewpoint is the recognition that “alliances and coalitions are built on free will and 
shared responsibility” (emphasis added)� Then, in a possible jab at previous admin-
istrations (whether stocked with neoconservatives or liberal internationalists)— 
and, in truth, a practical and significant change—the summary proclaims: “While 
we will unapologetically represent America’s values and belief in democracy, we 
will not seek to impose our way of life by force�”37 But even as strongly, it states 
that “we expect allies and partners to contribute an equitable share to our mutu-
ally beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing 
their defense capabilities�” Those are not firm requirements found in CS21R� It is 
hard not to perceive that “accountability” is the main message of the NDS coop-
eration section and that the remaining standard alliance/partnership recitation in 
no way implies that America is absolutely dependent on its alliance structure or 
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that it expects any limits on its free will� In short, CS21R is built around alliances, 
partnerships, and (obviously) cooperation; the NDS is not�
Inclining one toward the cynical view that the two pages extolling cooperation 
are simply standard fare is the fact that they are followed by a concluding section 
titled “Reforming the Department for Greater Performance and Affordability�” 
That goal has remained beyond the power of mere humans (including Defense 
Secretaries) nearly forever�
THE STATUS OF CS21R
As previously noted, officially the Navy’s strategic vision remains A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready of March 2015, 
much better known by its acronym, CS21R� CS21R is a revision of the original 
CS21, signed by the three chiefs of the sea services (Marine Corps, Navy, Coast 
Guard) in 2007� No successor has replaced it; no naval leader has publicly repu-
diated it�
Although the original CS21 was released under Admiral Gary Roughead 
(CNO, 2007–11), it was largely a confirmation of the concept of Admiral Michael 
G� Mullen (CNO, 2005–2007; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007–11) of 
a one-thousand-ship Navy (without using that term), consisting of the U�S� fleet 
and those of its allies and partners who would cooperate to ensure security at sea 
in accordance with international law and guided by the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)�38 Thus, the changes in the 
world environment between 2007 and 2015 (primarily the expansion of a poten-
tially hostile People’s Liberation Army [PLA], along with the definite hostility of 
Russian president Vladimir Putin) necessitated a revision that—while maintain-
ing an emphasis on global partnerships—expands its discussion of U�S� naval 
missions or functions and a fleet design that describes the capabilities needed to 
carry out these functions� One could invite the PLA Navy (PLAN) to participate 
in the U�S� Navy’s annual RIMPAC exercise, but that would not mean the Chinese 
would honor any international tribunal ruling on law of the sea violations� Yet the 
flashing light of the one-thousand-ship Navy still shines through both texts; it is 
dimmer in the second (CS21R) only because the additional section was added to 
discuss naval missions and general force-design goals, making the revised docu-
ment twice as long as the original�
Consider the contrast� The Summary NDS devotes two of eleven pages to alli-
ances, partnerships, and international cooperation (18 percent of the document); 
CS21R devotes almost twenty of thirty-seven pages to alliances, partnerships, 
and international cooperation (54 percent)� This provides the initial clue that 
the CS21R does not quite fit the Trump administration’s focus on deterring (or, if 
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necessary, winning) great-power conflict with China or Russia� CS21R’s stress on 
cooperation always betrayed an optimistic view of the future roles of China and 
Russia in supporting the current international system (instead of undermining 
it) and often referred to their roles as “responsible stakeholders�” In contrast, the 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America of December 2017—
parent of the NDS—envisions a world of great-power competition in which 
cooperation cannot be assumed� Quite simply, CS21R is out of sync with current 
higher directives�
So, what can be salvaged? The second half of CS21R, beginning with “Seapow-
er in Support of National Security,” contains the traditional description of naval 
missions, including deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime se-
curity�39 But it also adds a fifth mission that had not appeared previously in other 
higher-level documents: “all domain access,” a focus on defeating the antiaccess 
“reconnaissance strike networks” of potential opponents�40
To achieve all-domain access requires the U�S� Navy, U�S� Marine Corps, and 
U�S� Coast Guard (to whatever extent it can) to commit to investments in bat-
tlespace awareness (persistent surveillance), assured command and control (resil-
ient networks that can fight jamming), cyberspace operations, electromagnetic- 
maneuver warfare (EMW) (i�e�, electronic warfare spread across domains), and 
integrated fires� This is certainly an appropriate list of capabilities necessary for 
countering antiaccess strategies� Additionally, it is similar to such lists contained 
in all subsequent USN public documents� If one added unmanned systems, ma-
chine learning, and AI as means of achieving the above capabilities, one would 
have a depiction of the Navy’s current desired investments� These desired capa-
bilities permeate discussions of the Navy’s future fleet designs�
THE CNO, THE DESIGN FOR MAINTAINING MARITIME SUPERIORITY, 
AND THE FUTURE NAVY
The current CNO, Admiral Richardson, has released a series of three white pa-
pers that describe a design for maritime superiority and the characteristics of the 
future navy� Although they would seem disconnected from some of the premises 
of CS21R, the first document, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, 
Version 1.0 (hereafter Design 1.0), describes itself as a step “along a future course 
to achieve the aims articulated in [CS21R] in this new environment�”41 (Notably, 
the subsequent Design 2.0 does not mention CS21R�)
Design 1.0
Design 1.0 is a total of eight pages that are intended to “guide our behaviors and 
investments, both this year and in the years to come�”42 However, it also states 
that “[m]ore specific details about programs and funding adjustments will be 
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reflected in our annual budget documents,” undoubtedly referring to, among 
others, the CNOG�
Design 1.0 begins by describing the U�S� Navy’s mission in the joint-approved, 
domain-specific fashion: as conducting “prompt and sustained combat incident 
to operations at sea�” But it subtly broadens this to include “protect[ing] America 
from attack and preserv[ing] America’s strategic influence in key regions of the 
world,” presumably through persistent naval presence� It follows with a descrip-
tion of the “strategic environment,” which links Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer 
Mahan’s articulation of the need for a navy that could guarantee access to inter-
national trade and overseas markets and materials to the technological changes 
driving prosperity� Later in the document, the CNO acknowledges the funda-
mental truths of the nature of war: “a violent human contest between thinking 
and adapting adversaries for political gain�” He cites the thinkers whose wisdom 
has shaped the Naval War College course curriculum: Mahan (obviously), Thu-
cydides, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao (strangely), and Corbett�43
Design 1.0 describes the strategic environment in terms of three trends, all 
of which have been articulated in previous Navy documents: increased interna-
tional trade across seas, and potentially through the Arctic; a continually growing 
global information network; and increased rates of technological creation and 
adoption, including robotics, energy storage, three-dimensional printing, low-
cost sensors, genetic sciences, and AI�
Adapting is the key point, and the CNO sees a peacetime competition in stra-
tegic technology among global powers: the United States, China, and Russia� This 
is a view that CNO Richardson has espoused frequently since the beginning of 
his tenure, before the election of President Trump, and in sync with proponents 
of the Third Offset Strategy such as former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Un-
der Secretary of the Navy Robert O� Work (albeit not in the same words)� Unlike 
CS21R, Design 1.0 very clearly refers to China and Russia, pointing out that the 
“Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in areas not seen for almost two 
decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach around the world�” (The 
+2 of North Korea and Iran also are mentioned, but very briefly�) Here is where 
technological advancement links with the Navy’s desired capabilities, as identi-
fied in the second half of CS21R; they are elements of the strategic competition 
with two regional powers that have antiaccess networks�
CNO Richardson does not use his predecessor’s assured access term, and he 
has made his dislike of antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) terminology evident�44 
Yet it would seem that the Navy’s goal is to adapt emerging technologies so as to 
retain (or regain) the ability to penetrate opponents’ A2/AD networks� A2/AD 
remains a regularly used term throughout DoD�
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Design 1.0 also lists the CNO’s view of Navy “core attributes of our profession” 
as consisting of “integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness�” These are 
distinct from the also-cited Navy core values of honor, courage, and commit-
ment� In the CNO’s guidance, “[i]f we abide by these attributes, our values should 
be clearly evident in our actions�”45 Although his predecessor expressed these 
attributes somewhat differently, the desire to define naval attributes provides a 
link to the quietly released How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval Warfighter, 
document number seven in our algorithm, of Admiral Jonathan W� Greenert, 
USN (CNO, 2011–15)�
The heart (and conclusion) of Design 1.0, however, is found in three pages 
describing the CNO’s “four lines of effort,” which are his objectives that are in-
tended to guide current Navy decision-making� Since each of the four lines of 
effort is individually color coded, it has become common for Navy staff officers 
to explain their projects or tasks in the form of “it supports purple (or blue, green, 
or yellow)�”
The first of the four lines (blue) is to “strengthen naval power at and from 
sea,” an obvious and continuing goal�46 Within this goal resides a prioritization 
of programs to align “our organization to best support generating operational 
excellence�” First is to “[m]aintain and modernize the undersea leg of the strategic 
deterrent triad,” described as “foundational to our survival as a nation�” Indeed, 
CNO Richardson consistently has identified the forthcoming Columbia-class 
SSBN as his priority acquisition program�47
The second program priority in the blue line is to develop and test new 
concepts through fleet exercises for war fighting in “highly ‘informationalized’ 
and contested environment[s]” in “partnership with the Marine Corps�” Since 
contested environment is a euphemism for A2/AD, one can speculate that this is 
intended to patch over some of the fraying between the two naval services that 
occurred during the development of the air-sea battle concept� The third priority 
calls for expansion of the EMW capabilities identified in CS21R�
This is followed by a related fourth priority: to “explore alternative fleet 
designs, including kinetic and non-kinetic payloads and both manned and 
unmanned systems” capable of operating in the “highly ‘informationalized’ en-
vironment�” Indeed, as we shall see, this is a task to which OPNAV is devoting a 
considerable amount of effort�
The two final tasks of the blue line are organizational examinations of U�S� 
Fleet Forces Command (FFC); Commander, Pacific Fleet; and OPNAV itself� In 
reality, the comprehensiveness of this task has been impacted by the more im-
mediate studies of the western Pacific warship collisions� However, a Second Fleet 
command has been created out of operational elements of FFC�
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The second line of effort (green) is to “achieve high velocity learning at every 
level�”48 Tasks in this line include the incorporation of best practices, expanding 
the use of “learning-centered technologies, simulators, online gaming, analytics 
and other tools,” and “[o]ptimiz[ing] the Navy intellectual enterprise�” Of per-
sonal concern to the CNO is his desire to make Navy wargaming—a learning tool 
for which the service is justifiably famous—more iterative, possibly via the use of 
AI or AI-assisted systems�
The third line of effort (yellow), to “strengthen our Navy team for the future,” 
focuses on improvements in personnel management and leadership, including 
information-technology learning in a Sailor 2025 program�49 It does not discuss 
radical changes to personnel accessions, however� Most of the language of yellow 
has been used before�
The fourth line of effort (purple) is to “expand and strengthen our network of 
partners�”50 But international partnerships (à la CS21R) are but a small piece of 
this effort, while partnerships with other services and agencies (including future 
planning and assessments), private research and development labs, and commer-
cial industry are emphasized�
Design 1.0 concludes with an exhortation for all to adopt a sense of urgency: 
“We will remain the world’s finest Navy only if we all fight each and every minute 
to get better� Our competitors are focused on taking the lead—we must pick up 
the pace and deny them� The margins of victory are razor thin—but decisive!”51 
No one could deny that the CNO sees the U�S� Navy locked in a strategic and 
technological competition with very capable opponents�
The Future Navy
However, by 2017, CNO Richardson, possibly concerned that his Navy continued 
to lack his sense of urgency, issued a supplemental white paper, The Future Navy� 
There have been some contending interpretations of the impact and importance 
of The Future Navy�52 In its defense, it is not designed to impart new direction or 
tasking beyond that already laid out in Design 1.0� Rather, as noted, it is intended 
to ratchet up the intensity of the Navy’s analytical efforts for determining how to 
integrate unmanned systems and other technological developments�
In part, The Future Navy white paper likely was a reaction to several future 
force architecture studies that were performed at the direction of Congress as 
part of defense legislation for fiscal year 2016 (FY16)� Congress (led by the late 
Senator John S� McCain) required three alternative studies of future Navy force 
structure (for the 2020–35 period) to use in checking the Navy’s thirty-year 
shipbuilding plan� The first was by an independent study group made up of Navy 
staff members from OPNAV N8, Fleet Forces Command, and the Naval War Col-
lege, and other naval analytical organization representatives� This report was not 
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staffed by the normal OPNAV process and was not endorsed by a cognizant flag 
officer but simply was forwarded to Congress by the CNO along with the other 
two alternative studies (via the Secretary of the Navy) without endorsement� This 
is the officially unofficial unclassified Navy Project Team report (source number 
five in table 1) that will be described later�53
At a total of nine pages, The Future Navy begins with its conclusions up front 
concerning the FY16 studies: (1) “the nation needs a more powerful Navy, on the 
order of 350 ships, [but] that includes a combination of manned and unmanned 
systems”; (2) “more platforms are necessary but not sufficient� The Navy must 
also incorporate new technologies and new operational concepts�” This is fol-
lowed by a section header intended to get across the sense of urgency: “Faster and 
More Complex� And Faster�”54
The Future Navy does add statements of the value of naval forward presence 
back into the dialogue, pointing out that the “presence of capable platforms 
enables naval forces’ inherent responsiveness” and that “U�S� ships are sovereign 
American territory” and “are self-sufficient when they respond�” However, this is 
couched as enabling the U�S� Navy (and Marine Corps) to be “full partners with 
the Army and Air Force as conflicts unfold,” being “often first on the scene, and 
continu[ing] to preserve U�S� interests in the long term, after the conflict sub-
sides, through continued and routine operations forward�”55
The Future Navy also attempts to clarify that, regardless of whether the opti-
mum fleet size is 355 ships, numbers of ships do matter, because “[t]he number 
of ships in the Navy’s fleet determines where we can be, and being there is a key 
to naval power�”56 In other words, a modern, highly capable warship may have the 
firepower of two less capable vessels, but—unlike the pair—that one ship cannot 
be in two oceans at the same time� Quantity does have a quality that quality alone 
cannot replicate�
The remaining text of The Future Navy concentrates on the need for greater 
force connectivity (even while dispersed), technological advances such as those 
identified in Design 1.0, and unmanned and autonomous systems as both exten-
sions of existing platforms and sources of new capabilities�
One observation that does appear in The Future Navy and not in the other 
sources discussed here is CNO Richardson’s conviction that the defense indus-
trial bases can increase their speed of production to build a larger fleet faster than 
some analysts suggest� “Multiple shipbuilding and aircraft production lines are 
‘hot’—currently producing”—but “[t]hey can do more� � � � Buying aircraft car-
riers at the economically-optimal rate—three or four years apart instead of the 
current five or more years—will not only get us a more powerful fleet faster, but 
also will save considerable money� � � � [Likewise,] an analysis of the industrial 
base shows we could build up to seven additional destroyers in the near term, 
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and up to 14 more small surface combatants�”57 Similar industrial base statistics 
are cited for other ship types, adding to a total of “29 more ships and almost 300 
more aircraft over the next seven years than our current plan�” Therefore, if there 
is the will, the sense of urgency can be answered with action�
Design 2.0
In December 2018, the CNO released A Design for Maintaining Maritime Supe-
riority, Version 2.0� Advance CNO briefings about the document indicated that 
it would note both areas in which progress had been made and where more or 
different types of progress would be needed� It does both, and, more importantly, 
it attempts to balance an ever-increasing sense of urgency against the need for 
“sustainability”—the avoidance of “overextension in the short- and long-term�” 
Overextension is defined as “the pursuit of ends that are beyond the ways and 
means of the force�”58 Although the remarks on overextension appear in a section 
entitled “Our Response” (to the challenges of competition with China and Rus-
sia), it is buttressed by an earlier statement on the security environment: “We can-
not become overwhelmed by the blistering pace� This is a long-term competition� 
We must think in terms of infinite, instead of finite, time frames� Only sustainable 
approaches will prevail�”59
Design 2.0 continues the four color lines of effort; however, “yellow” has been 
changed to “gold�” Their overall substance remains the same, but they are packed 
with much more detail, which is why Design 2.0 is twenty pages, whereas Design 
1.0 was eight� The green line of effort is modified significantly from “achieve high 
velocity learning at every level” to “achieve high velocity outcomes,” which allows 
for inclusion of very specific acquisition goals that did not appear in the previous 
version� These acquisition goals include the following: “Award the Future Frigate 
contract by 2020 to deliver as soon as possible (ASAP)� � � � Develop and field an 
offensive hypersonic weapon by 2025,” and other equally specific items�60 There 
is a bit of irony, however, in having these goals as directives in a CNO-authored 
document since—as the CNO himself admits—DoD reorganizations in the past 
three decades have resulted in very limited CNO control over the acquisition pro-
cess� The program executive officers of Navy acquisition programs largely report 
to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition), 
with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense critiquing almost every 
step along the way�
The green line also splits Navy analytical efforts into a “concept development 
hub” centered on the East Coast (DEVGRUEAST) and a “capability development 
hub” centered on the West Coast (DEVGRUWEST)� Of the Navy’s advanced edu-
cational institutions, the Naval War College would be a core of the former and the 
Naval Postgraduate School a core of the latter�
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Meanwhile, the revised blue line identifies continuing Navy support to recent 
operational changes: the reestablishment of Commander, Second Fleet in the 
Atlantic, and the implementation of the dynamic force employment concept 
outlined in the NDS to make warship deployments more situational and less 
predictable�61 The gold line adds the establishment of a three-star Director for 
War fighting Development (including education, experimentation, and analysis) 
as N7 in OPNAV� The purple line’s discussion of partnerships specifically delin-
eates supporting NATO and maturing Joint Forces Command–Norfolk “as the 
NATO headquarters for high-end naval operations and warfare in the Atlantic 
theater�”62
Additionally, the CNO attached two letters to Design 2.0 as addenda� The first, 
a “Charge of Command” to commanding officers, clearly reiterates that “[t]he 
responsibility of the Commanding Officer for his or her command is absolute,” 
under all circumstances� The second, “One Navy Team,” emphasizes inclusion 
and diversity within the Navy�
AIR-SEA BATTLE: FROM VISIBLE FOCUS TO UNDER THE RADAR
If broadened beyond its (presumably) exclusive focus on the PLA, the air-sea 
battle concept that consumed so much of the Navy’s intellectual capital (along 
with some of the U�S� Air Force’s) earlier in this decade could make a coherent 
Navy strategic vision by itself� Similarities to the Maritime Strategy are evident� 
The basic concept was to integrate Navy and Air Force capabilities to deal more 
effectively with the toughest potential war-fighting challenge of the day: to defeat 
the PRC’s antiaccess strategy and respond to PRC aggression by conducting op-
erations within Chinese-claimed water and airspace, including targeting military 
forces ashore� In short, it attempted to answer the A2/AD problem�
A detailed argument has been made that the Cold War–era Maritime Strat-
egy was itself a counter-antiaccess strategy, with the U�S� Navy and Marine 
Corps attempting to penetrate the layers of Soviet long-range bombers, cruise- 
missile-firing submarines, and the Soviet naval fleet to breach the Soviet Union’s 
periphery and take pressure away from NATO’s central land front in Europe�63 
Ironically, the title Air-Sea Battle is a reference to the air/land battle doctrine 
that the U�S� Army and Air Force fashioned jointly to blunt a Soviet offensive 
on the central front� Similar to the Maritime Strategy, Air-Sea Battle acquired a 
number of influential academic and policy opponents, whose resistance gave the 
appearance of official doctrine to what, in reality, was a combination of think 
tank publications and an Air-Sea Battle Office assigned the task of coordinating 
USN and USAF programs appropriate to an antiaccess scenario in the East Asian 
maritime and littoral regions�64
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   144 2/25/19   10:40 AM
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/20
 TA N G R E D I  1 4 5
However, by 2015, the air-sea battle concept was devitalized and finally con-
sumed by joint ideology� It was a very logical approach to containing potential 
PRC expansion—so logical that it frightened the U�S� Army (which naturally 
had focused its force structure on “winning the wars we are in”) into believing 
it could lose its appropriate share of the defense budget� Obviously, no one was 
contemplating a land war in East Asia� If counterterrorism would no longer 
be the primary fight for U�S� armed forces, what would be the role of decisive 
land forces? (At the same time, the Marine Corps—which would have a role in 
a maritime campaign—became concerned that its permanent partner, the U�S� 
Navy, might be spurning it for greater integration with the Air Force�) The result 
of bureaucratic and political pressure was that the Navy–Air Force Air-Sea Battle 
Office was converted into a joint staff with the inclusion of Army and Marine 
Corps representatives and outside contractors, under the supervision of the Joint 
Staff, to develop a concept for joint access and maneuver in the global commons 
(JAM-GC)�
JAM-GC is another document that is classified but whose drafters have dis-
cussed it in open-source literature�65 However, it is focused on a problem that is 
different from the air-sea battle concept� Its primary focus—access of military 
forces into and within the global commons of sea, airspace over the oceans, and 
space, all of which are not contested seriously—is not the same challenge as the 
penetration of PRC antiaccess networks, the hardware of which is located largely 
within sovereign PRC territory�66
Thus, the Navy lost control of a concept and narrative that could define its 
de facto strategic focus: deterring potential PRC aggression by holding at risk 
China’s antiaccess networks and its protection of its military capabilities and 
homeland territory, and doing likewise to the potential threats of Russia, North 
Korea, and Iran� Such an effort would require capabilities to defeat the PLA’s 
maritime and conventionally armed rocket forces and to suppress its land-based 
air defenses, hence requiring close Navy / Air Force collaboration� Inclusion of 
decisive ground forces simply would not seem to be a part of this mission—the 
approximation of a Cold War Maritime Strategy without any central-front battle 
on land� Such an independent strategic vision of the Navy’s primary war-fighting 
purpose conflicts with the twenty-first-century version of joint ideology that 
mandates participation (or at least veto power) of every service in every mission�
Given the reluctance of the Obama administration to identify the PRC as a pri-
mary security threat, slipping the premises and operational concepts of Air-Sea 
Battle under the radar in favor of the joint examination of a much more theoreti-
cal threat could be justified� However, the Trump administration’s National Se-
curity Strategy and the NDS provide the justification for its resurrection� There is 
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much in the air-sea battle concept that could shape a naval strategic vision—and, 
because of the Navy’s focus on the Indo-Pacific region, it already has�
PACIFIC FLEET DOMINANCE OVER NAVAL STRATEGY
Although there is no one public document at which to point, the dominance of 
the U�S� Pacific Fleet in defining the Navy’s de facto strategic vision is evident and 
deserves some comment�
The Obama administration’s pivot to the Pacific may have required an adjust-
ment for other U�S� agencies, but the USN pivot occurred prior to the 2006 trans-
formation of U�S� Atlantic Fleet into FFC� The Atlantic’s numbered war-fighting 
command, U�S� Second Fleet, also was disestablished in 2006� This move could 
be viewed as a delayed response to the collapse of the Soviet navy (and Soviet 
Union)� The change also was prompted by the conversion of the joint combatant 
command (COCOM) U�S� Atlantic Command into U�S� Joint Forces Command 
(JFCOM) in 1999, an obvious indication that American decision makers did not 
envision a challenge from the Russian navy (or anyone else) in the Atlantic Ocean 
region�67 FFC retained responsibility for training and readiness for Atlantic-based 
U�S� naval forces but also took a lead position in “providing” naval forces for all 
COCOMs� Additionally, FFC was assigned “command and control of subordinate 
Navy forces and shore activities during the planning and execution of assigned 
service functions in support of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)�”68 This par-
alleled the tasking of JFCOM to support the Joint Staff� (Ironically, JFCOM was 
disestablished in 2011 and its functions were transferred back to the Joint Staff�)
The result of the former Atlantic Fleet taking on staff responsibilities that 
might otherwise be directed by OPNAV was that its focus on naval war planning 
became diluted in comparison with U�S� Pacific Fleet, which, additionally, has a 
present potential threat in an expansionist PRC� Because of this circumstance and 
the force of personality of the commanders, Pacific Fleet increased its influence 
on naval strategy as a whole, with the creation of Air-Sea Battle as but one result� 
Through a series of articles and statements, and with heavy use of the Navy’s 
wargaming and analytical assets, Commander, U�S� Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT), 
Admiral Scott H� Swift, USN (COMPACFLT, 2015–18), became a primary 
spokesman not only in identifying the PLAN as the U�S� Navy’s primary “pacing” 
threat but in elucidating the changes the U�S� Navy would make to meet it�69 It 
became obvious that U�S� Pacific Fleet sought its direction directly from the CNO, 
not through FFC, and, in turn, sought to influence the CNO’s vision�
With the tremendous expansion of the PLAN, it is logical that the Pacific 
region would focus and dominate Navy thinking in the same way that impe-
rial Japan did during the interwar years� However, with the reactivation of U�S� 
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Second Fleet on August 24, 2018, as a subordinate of FFC, it is possible that this 
dominance eventually will be challenged�
AN OFFICIALLY UNOFFICIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY16 required DoD to furnish 
Congress with three studies of the composition of the future U�S� fleet that would 
function as alternatives to the U�S� Navy’s thirty-year shipbuilding plan� As previ-
ously noted, the first of these studies was conducted by a Navy team consisting of 
subject-matter experts from naval analytical organizations without the concur-
rence or endorsement of DON leadership� The other two were conducted by a 
federally funded research and development center, MITRE Corporation, and an 
independent think tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analyses (CSBA, 
which previously had devoted a considerable amount of its own research to Air-
Sea Battle)�
The three reports took significantly different approaches to evaluating a future 
fleet� MITRE evaluated requirements against an air-sea approach to defeating 
the antiaccess “reconnaissance strike network” of the PRC� The result was a set 
of specific recommendations concerning new capabilities and platforms� CSBA 
proposed a new concept for naval operations, dividing the fleet between tailored 
regional presence forces and a powerful maneuver force that would surge to a 
region of conflict� Meanwhile, the Navy team centered its recommendations on 
three concepts then under investigation by FFC and Pacific Fleet: distributed 
fleet lethality; EMW; and distributed, agile logistics�70 The visibility and viability 
of these three concepts have been challenged and their relative prominence has 
changed since then because of changes in operational Navy leadership� However, 
it is fair to conclude that they still might be, or eventually will be, aspects of a 
Navy strategic vision�71
The guiding premise of the Navy Project Team was that the Navy needs a 
distributed fleet, which would be created by breaking the current methodology 
of battle-force deployments centered on an aircraft carrier strike group (CSG, 
formerly known as CVBG for “carrier battle group”) consisting of an aircraft car-
rier, destroyers as escorts, and associated logistics ships� In contrast, a distributed 
architecture “would field a widely dispersed force, operating in dozens of areas, 
netted to mass firepower, and supported by robust kill chains and survivable 
logistics�”72 The study views the proposed change from CSG-centered operations 
to a distributed architecture of dispersed forces as a significant change in the 
Navy’s operational strategy (and thereby in its strategic concept or strategic vi-
sion)� The distributed fleet architecture integrates the three mutually supporting 
concepts of distributed fleet lethality; EMW; and distributed, agile logistics�
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   147 2/25/19   10:40 AM
19
Tangredi: Running Silent and Algorithmic: The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 1 4 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Distributed lethality was a concept championed by Vice Admiral Thomas S� 
Rowden, USN, former Commander, Naval Surface Forces, and Naval Surface 
Force, Pacific�73 In its simplest expression, the concept proposed placing offensive 
weapons on platforms that previously had not carried them—particularly the 
littoral combat ship (LCS) and, presumably, amphibious warships and combat 
logistics force ships� Unfortunately, the details for the latter two types of vessels 
were never elucidated prior to Vice Admiral Rowden’s retirement in February 
2018, and choosing a missile for the LCSs took an unexpectedly long time� Vice 
Admiral Rowden tied distributed lethality to his desire to shift the focus of the 
surface navy away from the power-projection (strike against land) mission em-
phasized by Air-Sea Battle and toward sea control against the PLAN fleet�74 With 
the change in surface navy leadership, the status of distributed lethality is now 
unclear�
The EMW concept is described by the Navy team study as promoting “im-
provements in protected, assured datalinks and communications paths � � � to 
support a geographically distributed force � � � [including] unmanned vehicles,” 
as well as providing “soft-kill” of enemy communications and weapons systems�75 
EMW is also an element contained in CS21R and can be considered almost a 
traditional operational concept for the modern U�S� Navy, since it was clearly a 
major component of war-fighting operations in previous conflicts�
The third concept on which the study was built—distributed, agile logistics—
is described as combining “new technologies, more secure shore-based hubs, 
afloat sea-based hubs, afloat sea-bases supporting maneuver forces, and assured 
and resilient logistics command and control networks to sustain distributed fleet 
operations in a contested environment�”76 Unfortunately, there is no program-
matic evidence or public, professional discussions that indicate that distributed, 
agile logistics is a developed or developing concept� Improvements in the Navy’s 
current logistics capabilities remain marginal, incremental, and secondary to 
acquisition of new combat platforms� Since 2017, the distributed, agile logistics 
nomenclature has been used only rarely� However, there has been public discus-
sion of improving capabilities for rearming vertical-launch system missiles at 
sea, a capability in which the U�S� Navy chose not to invest during the unipolar 
moment� There also is a recognition within the Navy that greater planning and 
resources need to be directed toward improving logistics capacity in contested 
environments�
In responding to Congress, the Navy team report argues that shifting to a dis-
tributed fleet requires a much greater number of platforms over the thirty-year 
shipbuilding plan that had proposed building up to 314 vessels (identified as 304 
manned, ten unmanned)� However, the report proposes a vast increase in large, 
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unmanned platforms and a comparatively modest increase in manned ships� 
Proposed numbers are 321 manned, 136 unmanned, for a total of 457 vessels�77
What elements of the Navy Project Team report would constitute new aspects 
of a Navy strategic vision? There are at least two: (1) a move away from a CSG-
centered employment/deployment concept toward a distributed fleet, and (2) 
adoption of unmanned systems as equivalents to ships� Both would change both 
internal and public conceptions of naval operations and force structure� The 355-
ship goal postdates the submission to Congress of the Navy Project Team report�
THE RHETORIC OF 355 SHIPS
Most critics view the Navy as opportunistic in publicizing a goal of 355 battle-
force ships for a future fleet�78 There seemed to be little coincidence in the fact 
that presidential candidate Trump suggested the number of 350 ships as an ap-
propriate size for the American fleet during his campaign� (This was first suggest-
ed on September 7, 2016, in a campaign speech in Philadelphia� In subsequent 
speeches as president, he has adopted the 355 number�)79 At the time, few inside 
the Beltway possibly could conceive of a Trump victory and the Navy was content 
to urge a fleet size of 308, derived from a Navy Force Structure Assessment (FSA) 
conducted in 2014� Once President Trump achieved his unexpected electoral 
victory, the Navy issued a new FSA on December 14, 2016, “justifying” the 355 
number, with the claim that the assessment had been conducted in a thoroughly 
analytical manner� Critical doubts about the thoroughness of the analytics have 
prompted the Navy more recently to conduct a new, 2019 FSA (already under 
way) that “is expected to better detail the types of ships needed�”80
However, as noted in the Navy Project Team report to Congress (source num-
ber five in table 1) and the competing independent reports, the 355 number (de-
pending on how calculated) is actually a lower estimate of the fleet size required 
for a full-scale conflict versus the PRC or Russia, let alone a fleet to handle some 
mix of dispersed 2+2 contingencies� The Navy Project Team called for a total of 
457 ships, although 136 of those would be large, unmanned vessels� The com-
peting reports from CSBA and MITRE called for 382 (arguably 340, by current 
ship-counting rules) and 414 ships, respectively�
It is difficult to find a single independent naval analyst who will argue that 
fewer than 355 ships would be sufficient to ensure victory in a naval campaign 
against the antiaccess network of the PRC� Instead, many will argue that the cur-
rent defense budget cannot support the acquisition and subsequent operations 
and maintenance costs of a 355-ship fleet—making that estimate moot�81 How-
ever, that is a different assessment from whether the current fleet would prevail 
in war or even match peacetime COCOM requirements�
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What, then, does the 355 number really mean? It simply means that the U�S� 
Navy recognizes that in a world of 2+2 threats (as opposed to the assumption of 
global cooperation that laces CS21R), neither the current number of approxi-
mately 285 total ships, nor the thirty-year shipbuilding plan total of 304 ships, 
nor the previous 2014 FSA total of 308 would be enough when the potential op-
ponent (the PRC) simply is building ships—with designed capabilities similar to 
U�S� warships—at a much faster rate� Unlike under previous administrations, the 
Navy leadership now is willing to say so� In previous administrations, the rhetoric 
was that, even if fewer in numbers, U�S� warships were more capable� Yet again, 
rigorous and detailed unclassified/open-source analyses of that claim have not 
been conducted in recent years� And they particularly have not been done in the 
context of planned PLA capabilities (such as indigenous aircraft carrier construc-
tion)� From the perspective of an aspirational goal, and given the lack of detailed 
analyses, 355 ships is as good a number as any other that is greater than today’s�82
The wrinkle, however, is that the acquisition of a 355-ship Navy now has 
become law! The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act includes a provision 
requiring a buildup to 355 ships “as soon as practicable�”83 Of course, the weak-
ness of the statement (“as soon as practicable” could be 2050) and the inability 
to enforce such a provision—even if it were to be placed into a subsequent ap-
propriations act—is well evident to the rest of Congress� As noted, changes in 
House of Representatives leadership following the 2018 midterm elections augur 
fiscal restraints�
HOW WE (MIGHT) FIGHT
Of all the inputs to the algorithm, How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval War-
fighter is the least authoritative but originally was intended to be the most pub-
licly accessible�84 It remained on CNO Greenert’s “to do” list from his first day in 
office but with a low priority, so attending to other events frequently superseded 
work on it, and it was released only several months before his retirement from 
office in September 2015� It was placed on the Navy’s professional reading list 
immediately, but—since it never was endorsed by his successor, Admiral Rich-
ardson, and never was publicized—its impact on public debate can be described, 
charitably, as minimal�
CNO Greenert envisioned a public monograph that would explain the mis-
sions, attributes, capabilities, current operational concepts, and combat history 
(in brief) of the U�S� Navy to new officers and petty officers and the American 
public at large�85 It was meant to highlight the uniqueness of the Navy (with all 
the consequences for public and congressional support that implies)� With a final 
product at 166 pages, it obviously is a more extensive exposition than a standard 
official document� It is not a service strategic vision, per se, but describes its 
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purpose thus: “to articulate in a single volume the elements that determine the 
way we [the Navy] operate, as well as some of the overall concepts that guide 
our methods.” The book proceeds in a logical sequence, describing the shaping 
factors of “the maritime environment, our Service attributes, our history, and 
our current and projected future missions,” in that order.86 This is more akin to 
Samuel Huntington’s strategic concept approach to articulating the Navy’s pur-
pose than the more recent strategic vision approach.
The value of How We Fight as an evocation of the Navy’s strategic vision is 
that it gathers many of the justifying arguments used by the strategic-level docu-
ments into one source. Many of the justifying arguments are captured succinctly 
in tables and, more importantly, are presented in context rather than the isolated 
factoid manner in which they appear in other documents. As an example, the 
“political characteristics of the maritime environment” (which, incidentally, are 
not mentioned at all in the Summary NDS) are listed as the following: 
 • Customary Law of the Sea (LOS) provides rights of ships, delineates high seas 
from territorial seas
 • Warships are the sovereign territory of their nation wherever they operate in  
accordance with LOS
 • Freedom of navigation must be demonstrated against unlawful claims
 • Sea provides a base for power projection, forward presence and crisis  
response
 • Littorals are population, economic and political centers
 • Operating forward, navies have considerable political influence and deterrent  
effects and can provide humanitarian assistance87
Similar concise depictions and tables are provided for physical characteristics, 
economic characteristics, strategic and tactical attributes, basic types of naval 
warfare, future trends with operational effects, and others—all often incorpo-
rated into Navy strategic documents but rarely roped into one corral in mutual 
support. The ties to the other sources also include expanded discussions of all-
domain access and EMW, both introduced in CS21R and, in the case of EMW, 
remaining in subsequent documents. Access and EMW are placed in the context 
of more-traditional naval warfare areas such as air warfare and missile defense, 
expeditionary warfare, strike warfare, surface warfare, and undersea warfare. 
Resilience is discussed as an attribute required of sailors as well as ships, which 
resonates with CNO Richardson, even if he prefers the word toughness.
In bringing the seven sources into a Navy future vision, How We Fight could 
be put in the “background information and detailed explanation” category, 
supporting the more authoritative documents. However, given its content and 
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structure, perhaps the work would be better subtitled “Handbook for Drafting 
Navy Strategic Visions�”88
GLEANING FROM OTHER SOURCES
Other sources from which may be gleaned additional clues about the Navy’s 
strategic vision include the DON Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Financial Report, a 
report that appears to have taken the place of what once was the Annual Report 
of the Secretary of the Navy to Congress�89 The title and format of the report have 
changed throughout different presidential administrations, but it still is meant to 
be a DON report created independently of the Office of the Secretary of Defense� 
To deconflict potential parochial statements by the Secretary of the Navy from 
more-authoritative statements by the Secretary of Defense, the report’s scope has 
been narrowed to focus on the DON budget� However, it still gives the Secretary 
of the Navy some room to discuss priorities and objectives that could shape a 
new naval narrative�
Other sources are the congressional testimonies of the Navy leadership as well 
as speeches and articles, primarily by the Secretary of the Navy and CNO, to a 
wide variety of audiences� As in political stump speeches, frequently repeated 
themes indicate elements of the Navy strategic vision� Such speeches and articles 
might be expected to coincide with the NDS, CS21R, and the other five sources 
we have examined� However, they often are tailored to audiences in a way that 
can identify emerging concepts not elucidated previously� Other naval leaders 
also may expound on emerging concepts�
Many of the speeches can be obtained from official Navy websites (such as 
www�navy�mil)� However, much more can be gleaned from the independent 
professional publication U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings, which routinely pub-
lishes articles by senior naval leaders alongside critiques, alternative ideas, and 
criticisms by other serving naval personnel and civilians in a continuing debate 
on the future of national security� Few ideas make it into naval documents that 
have not been discussed—perhaps debated fiercely—in Proceedings previously�
Authoritative information also can be obtained from reports on the Navy 
prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO)� Even OPNAV staffers rely on CRS and CBO 
reports as quick sources for data�
AND THEN THERE IS THE POM
The longest-running debate concerning DoD is whether it is strategy or budget 
that drives its programs and force structure�90 In theory, national strategy should 
be the driving factor� The military is a tool the nation uses to achieve its security 
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objectives in a dangerous world� Of course, the economic reality is that wants are 
generally unlimited, while resources are limited� In battle, the commander wants 
every possible resource available to defeat the enemy while preserving the lives 
of his or her own troops� History indicates that overwhelming force applied deci-
sively ends most wars quickly� Yet no one can determine fully how much money 
to spend on security since—at least for democratic states—wars can be predicted 
only in the abstract, not their precise occurrence in time and space�
In peacetime, a democratic state may use a security strategy to determine 
the details of its military, but funding these details becomes a political process 
requiring compromise among competing domestic requirements� This is a weak-
ness that democratic states do not necessarily share with authoritarian states 
having command (or mostly command) economies� The situation provokes 
critics to argue that public strategy documents are poor guides for determining 
a democratic state’s defense strategy�91 Better, they argue, to “follow the money” 
in the president’s budget submission and congressional legislation� Others have 
argued that a realistic strategic vision should be designed primarily on the basis 
of resources available, rather than the service’s (or defense agency’s) self-concept 
or aspirations�
For the Navy, CNO Richardson attempted to end the debate by directing in 
October 2016 that the Navy’s POM process be initiated by the Deputy CNO 
(DCNO) for Operations, Plans and Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5) and consist of 
three phases�92 First is the strategy phase, led by OPNAV N3/N5, with other 
OPNAV staff codes participating, followed by a requirements program-integration 
phase, led by the DCNO for Warfare Systems (OPNAV N9), and a resource-
integration phase, led by the DCNO for Integration of Capabilities and Resources 
(OPNAV N8)� At the CNO’s direction, “under this new process, POM-19 and 
subsequent POMs [began] three months earlier than historical POMs � � � [with] 
the end product of the POM development process [being] a strategy-based, fis-
cally balanced, and defendable Navy Program for submission to OSD [Office of 
the Secretary of Defense], which appropriately implements OSD fiscal and pro-
gramming guidance, addresses [Secretary of the Navy] and CNO priorities, and 
achieves the best balance of strategic guidance as provided in the CNOG�”93 To 
achieve this result, the CNO also directed an OPNAV staff realignment�
The significance of the CNO’s directive is that it again reinforces the theoreti-
cal role of strategy as the determinant of program requirements and force struc-
ture� In turn, this also should reestablish the importance of a Navy strategic vision 
in guiding future Navy decision-making� Of course, thorough implementation of 
the renewed process under the congressional mandate of a 25 percent headquar-
ters staff reduction throughout DoD may prove challenging�
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   153 2/25/19   10:40 AM
25
Tangredi: Running Silent and Algorithmic: The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 1 5 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
A MURKY MIX
If we metaphorically sum up the algorithm, what can we determine concerning 
the U�S� Navy’s collective vision of its appropriate future?
Although the Navy always has had a reputation for independent views that 
make the staunchest joint ideologues livid, it is clear that CNO Richardson and 
the Navy leadership are committed to a vision that conforms to the 2018 NDS and 
its joint requirements� The problem they face is that the NDS (at least in its Sum-
mary) betrays a land-centric approach to understanding warfare that is hard to 
translate into a naval strategy� It is not only that the terminology does not fit naval 
campaigns; it is that, although there can be a tactically defensive naval posture, 
there is no such thing as a strategic defensive posture in naval warfare except not 
to fight at sea� Unlike in a land campaign, there are no physical spaces to defend, 
only forces� Thus, wartime forces at sea exist only to attack; there are no contact 
or blunt phases in naval warfare�
This problem is magnified by the fact that the great-power competition, which 
serves as the premise of the NDS, is not inherently a land-centric competition� If 
conflict were to break out today or in the immediate future with the potentially 
toughest opponent, the PLA, the fighting would not take place on the land� It 
primarily would be (for the United States) a counter-antiaccess campaign in the 
maritime, air, space, and electronic spectrum / cyber dimensions�94 No planner 
has suggested that it is in the interest of the United States and its allies to fight a 
land war in East Asia� Victory in a counter-antiaccess campaign would require 
strikes on military targets in mainland China (C4ISR nodes, missile TELs, air-
fields, command structures, etc�)� However, most of these strikes would not come 
from ground forces� Such a campaign simply does not fit a land-centric approach�
In the case of Russia, there could be ground combat, but—given the methods 
the Putin regime has demonstrated—it likely would be small-unit combat in a 
hybrid/gray-zone scenario� However, the likely locations of such scenarios—the 
High North, the Baltic region, the Black Sea—largely would require a naval and 
air response by U�S� forces, at least in the initial phases�
The other two potential opponents, Iran and North Korea, have unique char-
acteristics but would not present the regional-to-global character of great-power 
war� However, in both cases, the majority of U�S� forces would be located outside 
the contested territory and would require an initial maritime response to reenter�
Thus, it is very difficult to craft a naval strategic vision to satisfy the challenges 
of the great-power competition world while remaining within the confines of 
the public Summary NDS� A great-power-competition strategy for naval forces 
would be more similar to the Cold War Maritime Strategy than any recent con-
ception� However, a Maritime Strategy approach to describing the Navy’s vision 
rams into joint ideology�
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The NDS does discuss the need for allies and coalitions� CS21R is premised 
completely on such cooperation� However, the Trump administration does not 
appear willing to make the sacrifices necessary to maintain the tight alliance 
structure on which America’s Cold War posture was predicated and that is the 
overarching assumption of CS21R� If preserving the alliance structure is no lon-
ger a priority, much of the front section of CS21R cannot be a rallying point for 
the Navy’s public image�
There is nothing in the 2016 Design 1.0 that contradicts the 2018 Summary 
NDS� However, much of Design 1.0 is concerned with Navy organization, leader-
ship, and training—all subjects that are of great importance to the CNO and that 
have an impact on operations, but that are not involved primarily in defining the 
service’s force structure or employment� The sections that discuss force structure 
assessments have stimulated debate and resulted in considerable internal discus-
sion concerning gaps in naval capabilities and employment of unmanned and 
potentially autonomous platforms, but it was not the CNO’s intent to define an 
answer to such questions� Design 1.0 does emphasize the complexity of contested 
environments, particularly the need for the Navy to examine how it would op-
erate in severe electromagnetic warfare conditions that would interfere with its 
objective to conduct dispersed but networked operations� This is a problem that 
OPNAV and the fleet commands previously had a tendency to ignore, although 
the Naval Postgraduate School has been examining the need for “network op-
tional” operations for some time�95
CNO Richardson’s The Future Navy also is in sync with the NDS and willing 
to name names concerning the threats from the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and 
Iran� The paper’s emphasis is new technology development, and in its own way 
it casts doubt on the 355-ship number as a defining metric by maintaining that a 
“355-ship Navy using current technology is insufficient for maintaining maritime 
superiority�”96 Rapid introduction of technology is the CNO’s measure of success�
There is a significant contradiction within the CNO’s white paper series, how-
ever� This contradiction begins to show itself in Design 2.0, in the remarks on 
sustainability and the call to avoid being overwhelmed by the blistering pace� It 
is the CNO who is directing—throughout the three papers—the sense of urgency 
in response to the security environment� One could surmise that, in adding the 
caution in his second version of the Design, he is reacting to analyses of the recent 
Seventh Fleet ship collisions that blamed them, in part, on a sense of operational 
urgency that required the crews to skip necessary training and certification� 
Indeed, Design 2.0 does direct the “execution of the Comprehensive Review and 
Strategic Readiness Review program” resulting from the accident investigations�97 
Yet the sense of great urgency remains at the forefront, and there are no details on 
how to achieve a balance between that and sustainability�
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Moreover, there seems to be no final, identifiable goal� In saying that “[w]e 
must think in terms of infinite, instead of finite, time frames,” the CNO is giving 
the Navy an endless quest�98 How can one maintain morale and conviction in the 
face of a perilous and absolutely infinite voyage? Even in the high-tempo/high-
pressure competition of the Cold War, American leaders held to the expectation 
that someday the internal contradictions in Communism would bring about its 
own collapse� There was, therefore, light at the far end of the tunnel, a victory 
(through deterrence) for which to strive� Not only does Design 2.0 not define an 
end state, but it seems to imply that—except through a major war—there is no 
possible end to the urgent, relax-not-a-minute military competition� It is hard to 
establish a pace or balance if there is nothing but an endless loop ahead� And it is 
hard to construct a persuasive public Navy strategic vision if endless competition 
is the only goal—a reason why the Design series, in itself, cannot fill the role of 
Navy vision�
The air-sea battle concept certainly would support the objectives of the NDS, 
but it only defines one particular Navy mission, in one particular theater� On 
the other hand, it does define a victory� Unfortunately, Air-Sea Battle effectively 
has been declared “not joint enough�” The whole premise of its joint successor, 
JAM-GC—that the struggle is over access to the global commons—is, in contrast, 
anemic�
The various force-structure assessments and the 355-ship number together do 
not constitute a strategic vision� Meanwhile, How We Fight is obviously too long 
for executive reading and does not have the narrative arc that makes modern 
nonfiction popular�
Therefore, the overall conclusions are as follows:
 1� The Navy leadership recognizes that CS21R does not fit the Trump 
administration’s needs for a Navy strategic vision� Some sections could 
be recycled, but the overall package has been overtaken by events�
 2� The current Navy leadership does want to have a Navy vision that fully 
supports the NDS focus on great-power competition, but the NDS (at 
least in its Summary) is not written in a way that the Navy can parrot� 
The tenor of the NDS seems to be that because strategy should be 
joint, there is no distinction in the strategic approaches to land and 
naval combat� (We will put traditional airpower doctrine aside for this 
discussion�)
 3� At present, the Navy leadership still is following Secretary of Defense 
Mattis’s concerns about the negative effects of extensive public 
discussion�99 A publicly articulated strategic vision is not a current 
priority�
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 4� Design 1.0 and its subsequent statements do give the Navy internal 
directions and tasks that conform to the NDS; however, they are 
not written in a way that would provide for a public strategic vision 
that captures the Navy’s current and future missions (and resulting 
structure)� Both Design 1.0 and 2.0 contain one-paragraph summaries of 
the Navy mission, but they are too brief to present a full image� Perhaps 
the most important inclusion from the CNO’s Design in a public vision 
would be his sense of urgency in experimentation and technology 
adoption�
 5� Nevertheless, a public, unclassified, strategic vision could enhance 
public and congressional support for the U�S� Navy� The correlation 
between a compelling public vision and enhanced support has been 
demonstrated historically�
 6� On the other hand, the internal programs and operations of the U�S� 
Navy do not need a publicly articulated and elegantly crafted vision to 
conform to the direction of the NDS. Highlighted by the pivot to the 
Pacific, the Navy largely had conformed to Secretary of Defense Mattis’s 
NDS even before the 2018 NDS existed�
 7� A Navy strategic vision that focuses on great-power competition as it 
exists and that conforms to the objective, although not the strategic, 
philosophy of the NDS would look more like Air-Sea Battle (with an 
appropriate addition of U�S� Marine Corps capabilities) than any other 
strategic concept currently extant� However, joint ideology and U�S� 
ground forces have defeated Air-Sea Battle. The air-sea battle concept 
had the misfortune of coming into prominence when the presidential 
administration did not want the word China spoken except in the 
context of that country inevitably being a “responsible stakeholder�” This 
prohibition does not apply, necessarily, to the current administration�
 8� The 355 number is a program and budgetary marker that, in itself, has 
no dependence on—nor does it provide a basis for—a Navy strategic 
vision�
 9� The panoply of Navy and independent force-structure assessments are 
useful for exposing appropriate debates—such as how much of the fleet 
should be unmanned, and why� The most-detailed analyses have been 
done appropriately on the basis of an Air-Sea Battle approach, even if it 
is not mentioned� Yet it is difficult to explain why the fleet should have 
355 ships instead of 354 or 353 or 350� The consensus is that the current 
number of approximately 285 is too low for war fighting and, possibly, 
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for great-power deterrence� What the actual number should be has not 
been assessed thus far to conclusive and persuasive rigor� What the new 
Congress will fund may be another number entirely�
 10� To provide the number of platforms necessary in a conflict against a 
great power, the Navy intends to pursue aggressively the development 
of unmanned surface and undersea vessels (as well as aircraft), some of 
which will be self-deploying and comparable in size to manned vessels� 
This could help operationalize the distributed fleet and distributed 
lethality concepts� The assumption, however, is that unmanned vessels 
can be acquired and operated more cheaply than manned platforms�
 11� A summarized How We Fight could provide the keel for an updated 
public Navy strategic vision, with appropriate NDS themes and Design 
1.0 and 2.0 concerns added� In its current state, however, How We Fight 
is an unread textbook�
What should a Navy strategic vision appropriate to the objectives of the NDS, 
the CNO’s directions, and Trump administration objectives overall say? Sum-
ming the algorithm and adding other clues, a concise recommended summary 
follows�
In the peacetime, military-technological competition with great powers, the 
U�S� Navy will experiment continually with new technologies and concepts so 
as to remain ahead of competitors and profit from the ideas of competitors, 
when appropriate� New technologies and concepts will be introduced to the fleet 
when matured and engineered for sea� These will include substantial numbers of 
unmanned, partly manned, and optionally manned vessels and aircraft, which—
combined with EMW capabilities—could enable a more widely distributed 
fleet� These experiments and developments—necessary for achieving victory in 
future conflicts—will take priority over the peacetime deployment and forward- 
presence requirements of the COCOMs� Additionally, a dynamic force- 
employment model will modify the previous predictability and length of forward 
deployments, allowing for greater experimentation�
The U�S� Navy will be sized and structured to support and win a conventional-
weapons joint campaign that likely will be primarily maritime (which includes 
air over sea, space, and electromagnetic/cyber warfare) in character against the 
PRC, as led by the CCP, or Russia, as led by President Putin� Being able to win 
such a conflict will provide the most effective deterrence against its occurrence� 
It is assumed that all other missions can be accomplished successfully by tailoring 
this force structure in scope to other assigned tasks�
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 1� The term strategic vision is used instead of 
strategy (as in the Maritime Strategy) because 
of the controversy over which Department 
of Defense component “does strategy�” Under 
joint ideology, the services man, train, and 
equip the forces, but do not create strategy, 
which is the exclusive purview of the combat-
ant commanders� While this may seem to be 
merely an argument over terminology, and 
despite the fact that the services and defense 
analysts routinely refer to service plans as 
“strategy,” use of the term strategic vision side-
steps that whole debate� Many of the plans 
are indeed visions that do not survive contact 
with the reality of the budget�
 2� The term strategy concept is from Samuel 
P� Huntington, “National Policy and the 
Transoceanic Navy,” U�S� Naval Institute 
Proceedings 80/5/615 (May 1954), pp� 483–93� 
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s, the 
U�S� Navy was enamored of using strategic 
concept to describe its definition of purpose, 
but it largely has been dropped in the last two 
decades� (For example, after the Cold War, 
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ 
Strategic Concepts Branch was renamed 
the Strategy and Concepts Branch�) This 
is another reason this article uses the term 
strategic vision�
With these capabilities, the U�S� Navy will carry out its enduring function 
as the guarantor of access to the global commons and to overseas markets and 
materials on which America’s economic prosperity depends� Access to the global 
commons also ensures the ability of the joint force to transit foreign areas of 
crises and conflict when called on� The U�S� Navy also will provide for defense of 
the U�S� homeland by maintaining the most survivable leg of the strategic nuclear 
triad, and the Navy can function as the forward edge of U�S� missile defense when 
necessary�
A perusal of U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings would indicate that the Navy has 
the narrative and speechwriting talent to write an updated public strategic vision 
quite well�
SAM J� TANGREDI
Dr. Sam J. Tangredi is a professor of national, naval, and maritime strategy and the 
director of the Institute for Future Warfare Studies at the Center for Naval Warfare 
Studies of the Naval War College. A retired Navy captain, his active-duty billets in-
cluded serving as head of the Strategy and Concepts Branch of the Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations and director of strategic planning and business development 
for the Navy International Programs Office, in addition to command at sea. He is 
the author of numerous articles on strategy and defense policy and has published 
five books, including Anti-access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Naval 
Institute Press, 2013).
N O T E S
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   159 2/25/19   10:40 AM
31
Tangredi: Running Silent and Algorithmic: The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 1 6 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 3� A bureaucratic reason that CS21R remains in 
the public vision is that it is a DON docu-
ment signed by the Secretary of the Navy as 
well as the heads of the three sea (not only 
naval) services: the U�S� Navy, U�S� Marine 
Corps, and U�S� Coast Guard (the latter is 
not actually part of the DON)� To negotiate 
a document approved and signed by all four 
individuals (thus representing all their equi-
ties) is a prodigious and lengthy effort�
 4� Like all endeavors done well by military offi-
cers and defense civil servants, the drafting of 
naval strategic visions takes time and energy 
that spill over between administrations, and 
the process does not necessarily follow the 
drafting of higher-level guidance (such as the 
National Security Strategy) in tight, sequential 
order� In the case of CS21R, drafting of the 
document—which involved Navy and Marine 
Corps staff officers, scholars at the Naval 
War College and Naval Postgraduate School, 
and other members of the naval analytical 
enterprise—began in the waning months 
of the George W� Bush administration, 
even though it eventually was issued under 
President Obama� For an assessment of the 
drafting of CS21R, see Peter Swartz, William 
Rosenau, and Hannah Kates, The Origins and 
Development of A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower (2015) (Arlington, 
VA: CNA, September 2017), available at www 
�cna�org/�
 5� An underlying theme found in Simon Reich 
and Peter Dombrowski, The End of Grand 
Strategy: US Maritime Operations in the 
Twenty-First Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Univ� Press, 2017)� The book, however, does 
not necessarily endorse the Trump adminis-
tration’s foreign policy perspective�
 6� There is an existing official USN web page 
that holds links to so-called strategic docu-
ments ranging from the Summary NDS and 
2018 Nuclear Posture Review to the U.S. Coast 
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